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I. INTRODUCTION 
As urban areas continue to grow outward, neighborhoods in the central cities are 
often faced with increased concentrations oflow-income residents, and therefore lower 
property values and vacant housing. While market forces generate housing rehabilitation 
and reoccupation in other areas of the city, in low income, inner-city communities, the 
market generates little private investment. In many cities, it is left to the public sector to 
respond with programs that fund vacant housing rehabilitation. St. Paul, Minnesota has 
one such program is called Houses to Homes. The program provides funds to fill the gap 
between renovation costs and sales prices for single-family homes and multiplex 
renovations to single-family use. Houses to Homes also funds demolition of substandard 
housing and new construction of owner-occupied, single-family homes on vacant lots. 
This report presents an analysis of the fiscal impacts of Houses to Homes. We 
compare the benefits and costs of three separate dispositions to vacated houses in St. Paul; 
rehabilitation, demolition, or private market reoccupation. In the first section of the • • 
report, we briefly summarize the vacant housing problem in St. Paul. In addition, we 
describe the Houses to Homes program, how it works, and what it has accomplished since 
1991. We also briefly compare the St. Paul response to vacant homes with programs 
created in other, comparable cities. In the second part of the report we present the 
findings of our analysis of the fiscal effects of Houses to Homes. 
THE VACANT HOUSING PROBLEM 
There are approximately 475 vacant houses on the city's official vacant housing list 
at any given time and an additional 100 vacant houses which either go unreported or are 
secured and maintained, and therefore do not make it to the list. From 1991 to 1995, 
1755 vacant properties were tracked by the city. These figures compare favorably to 
other mid-sized American cities, as shown in table 1. 
A study of housing conditions in ten comparable cities compiled by St. Paul 
Planning and Economic Development (PED) from 1990 Census data showed St. Paul had 
the lowest board-up rate and the least change in board-up rate from 1980 to 1990. 
TABLE 1: COMPARISON CITIES BOARD-UP RA TE AND CHANGE 
CITY BOARD-UP RA TE 1980-1990 CHANGE 
St. Paul 0.2% +0.1% 
Portland 0.3% +0.2% 
Minneapolis 0.4% +0.3% 
Milwaukee 0.6% +0.5% 
Tacoma 0.6% +0.5% 
Cincinnati 0.7% +0.1% 
Denver 0.8% +0.7% 
St. Petersbur_g 1.0% +0.9% 
Pittsburgh 1.3% +0.7% 
Fort Worth 1.8% + 1.5% 
Source: " J·f'orking Paper: How Does Saint Paul Compare? -Economic Trends in the 
1980s. " St. Paul Planning and Economic Development, 1993. 
While the number of vacant houses is not high in contrast to other cities, Map I 
shows that the vacant buildings are concentrated within the lower-income neighborhoods 
in the city, thereby intensifying their impact. 
MAP 1: HOUSES TO HOMES PROJECTS 1991-1995 
Houses to Homes Pro1ects 
t Rehabbed (2~0) Demolished (:132) lnlill (3.S) 
• Reoo:u;ned (1143) 
Source: St. Paul Planning and Economic Development. 
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Source: St. Paul Planning and Economic Development. 
Since 1992, a more aggressive public health enforcement policy has led to faster 
demolitions of problem vacant properties. The rate of demolition is outpacing new 
construction in the city, and the gap is widening (see Figure I). 
FIGURE 1: DEMOLITION AND NEW CONSTRUCTION PERMITS 1991-1995 
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,\ource: St. Paul License, Inspection and Environmental l'rotectwn. 
Vacant houses have many negative impacts on their neighborhoods. Recent 
studies of vacant property in Baltimore and Philadelphia identified the possible costs: 
• erosion of the property tax base due to lower values of deteriorated buildings or 
vacant lots where demolished structures once stood; 
• loss in tax revenue from tax delinquent and tax forfeited properties; 
• maintenance costs to the city or surrounding neighbors of keeping up or securing the 
property; 
• demolition costs if the building must be demolished out of public health or safety 
concerns; 
• general health and safety hazards from the deteriorated structures or people using the 
vacant building for criminal activity; 
• secondary impacts of depressing surrounding prop_erty values and property tax 
revenue; 
• deterrence of private investment by surrounding property owners; 
• perceiv.ed loss of social control; and 
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• hann the overall physical appearance of the neighborhood and its attractiveness as a 
place to live. 1 
Concern about these impacts has contributed to the call for public sector 
intervention in the rehabilitation of vacant houses. 
THE HOUSES TO HOMES PROGRAM 
The Houses to Homes program began in 1991 with the convergence of several 
forces. 2 In the St. Paul Planning and Economic Development Department there was a 
deputy director of neighborhoods and housing who is credited with being "responsible for 
some of the city's most innovative housing projects,"3 including Houses to Homes and the 
Middle Income Housing Fund. The staff within the division were looking at housing 
trends, including the results of the 1990 Census which showed increasing middle class 
flight from the city. They projected that the city's vacant housing inventory, which 
numbered over 600 units, would increase to over 1,000 if nothing was done. 
The mayor at the time was a neighborhood and community development advocate 
who focused his efforts on housing. The city was home to a local branch of the Local 
Initiatives-Support Corporation (LISC), a national nonprofit corporation that funds 
affordable housing development. LISC came to St. Paul in 1988, and by the early 1990s 
was working on capacity-building with St. Paul neighborhood-based community 
development corporations (CDCs). LISC was also seeking city commitment for 
rehabilitating housing to leverage $2.35 million in funds from national foundations. The 
proposal included creating homeownership opportunities in the city through the 
rehabilitation of vacant housing by non-profit CDC's." 
At the same time, city officials were trying to deal with its growing housing 
abandonment problem while simultaneously attempting to boost the rate of 
homeownership in the city. 
1 Philadelphia City Planning Commission. Vacant land in Philadelphia: A Report on Vacant land 
Management and Neighborhood Restructuring. Philadelphia, June 1995 and University of Marvland 
Community Planning Studio. Issues and Recommendations on Vacant Property in Baliimore, Baltimore, 
Fall 1995. 
: Information presented in this section is the result of a conversation with Gloria Bostrom, former deputy 
director of neighborhoods and housing. 25 July 1996 and St. Paul Planning and Economic Development, 
Houses to Homes: Saint Paul Vacant Housing Strategy for the 1990s. St. Paul, February 1991, except 
where otherwise indicated. 
3 
"Planning official leaves a legacy of innovative city housing programs." St. Paul Pioneer Press, 5 
Januarv I 995. 
4 Paul Fate. LISC Program Director. letter to Dan Cornejo, St. Paul Planning and Economic Development 
Director, 8 February 1991. 
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In Minnesota, homesteaded property can be tax delinquent for five years before the 
state takes title (this period was shortened to two years for properties in URAP-targeted 
areas in 1993). After the state takes ownership of the property, it may be another year 
before the property is put up for tax auction. The length of time required to take 
ownership of the property and the amount of additional deterioration which might occur 
during this period is a major frustration for officials implementing a vacant housing 
rehabilitation program. Other vacant houses might be HUD-foreclosed properties which, 
because of their condition or the condition of the surrounding neighborhood, are slow to 
reach the market or to sell. 
By creatively combining funds from a variety of city budgets dedicated to housing 
rehabilitation, staff were able to put together a pot of$1.5 million to be dedicated to 
financing the gap between the cost to acquire and rehabilitate vacant properties and their 
final market value. Much discussion surrounded the level at which the gap subsidies 
should be set. Following consideration of what the program hoped to accomplish, the 
subsidy level was set at $40,000 for rehabilitation of single-family vacant houses and 
$65,000 for rehabilitation and conversion of multi-family units to single-family structures. 
There was initial dissension about setting the subsidy level that high, but members of the 
committee felt that the program ought to create high quality housing in order to attract 
middle income people to the city and preserve historic structures. 
With the mayor's support, the program was approved by the city council and went 
into effect in 1991 with much fanfare in the local newspaper.5 Since 1991, 232 houses 
have been rehabilitated, 320 have been demolished, 34 vacant lots were built upon and 
1.169 vacant homes were reoccupied through the private market. 6 
How the program works 
Houses to Homes guidelines list the following program objectives: 
• to better coordinate and focus City actions through code enforcement, rehabilitation 
and demolition to address vacant buildings/houses~ 
• to contribute to revitalization and stabilization of neighborhoods~ 
• to increase homeownership opportunities; · 
• to save existing housing stock, where feasible~ 
• to recapture and improve the City's tax base~ and 
• to encourage private/public/community partnership centered around homeownership 
and other neighborhood revitalization efforts. 7 
5 
"St. Paul Gets $2.3 Million Housing Grant." St. Paul Pioneer Press. 28 February 1991 and "Couple gets 
first home through city program to repair vacant houses." St. Paul Pioneer Press. 24 August 1991. 
6 These figures include projects using city assistance through Houses to Homes gap financing. technical 
advice or other financing. 
7 St. Paul Planning and Economic Development, Houses to Homes Vacant House Assistance Program: 
Guidelines Overview. St. Paul. 1991. 
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The program provides gap subsidies as outlined above to non-profit or for-profit 
developers or prospective homeowners to fix up vacant houses which require moderate to 
substantial rehabilitation and are contributing to neighborhood blight. Homeowners must 
meet certain income criteria depending on the source of funds used for the gap financing. 
Gap financing can be used for acquisition, title and closing costs; construction and 
contingency funding; and carrying costs, resale closing costs, interim financing fees, 
marketing, design and developer fees. Rehabilitation is expected to go beyond simple 
compliance with city code requirements to make the properties marketable into the future. 
Certain regulatory requirements must also be met because public sector funding is 
involved. These include installation of a sprinkler system if the property is more than 50 
percent gutted, 8 lead paint and asbestos removal, replacement of lead water line service, 
and installation of windows meeting the Uniform Building Code when required. Program 
guidelines also allow for the Housing and Redevelopment Authority to grant waivers to 
the subsidy levels for "special historical or architectural treatment or a demonstrated 
public purpose. "9 
COMPARABLE PROGRAMS 
Urban Homesteading 
Urban Homesteading programs emerged in the early l 970's as part of the 
country's urban core neighborhoods suffered from blight and abandonment. Programs 
originated in east coast cities, where eligible would-be homeowners were offered tax-
forfeited vacant properties owned by the city. In exchange for the property title, 
homeowners agreed to fix up the property, using "sweat equity" for the work they could 
perform themselves and federal rehabilitation loans for work requiring professional 
assistance. The federal government picked up on the success of the local programs and 
started the Urban Homesteading Demonstration Program in 1973. 10 The program was 
very popular among legislators and the national press, particularly because of the imagery 
of hard-working homeowners taming a new frontier much like earlier generations 
conquered the West by developing land in exchange for title. 11 
8 According to a Met Council report, this is city requirement not found in other cities in Minnesota and 
seldom used nationwide. It was passed by the City Council with the support of the fire and department, 
plumbers and fire suppression unions with the belief that it is relatively inexpensive to install sprinklers 
when rehabilitation is talcing place and that installation might result in lower insurance costs. The study 
quoted city staff estimating that installing sprinkler systems could add as much as $4-6 per square foot to 
the rehabilitation and also found that few insurance companies off er discounts for buildings with sprinkler 
systems. (Metropolitan Council, Housing Redevelopment and Rehabilitation in the Twin Cities 
Metropolitan Area: Three Case Studies. St. Paul. November 1995, 35. 
9 St. Paul Planning and Economic Development. . 
10 U.S. General Accounting Office, Urban Homesteading: A Good Program Needing Improvement 
(Washington. D.C., GPO, 1979). 
11 Mittie Olion Chandler, Urban Homesteading: Programs and Policies (Greenwood Press, Westport, 
1988). 
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The demonstration program turned into a permanent program and was later 
expanded to include more cities nationwide. The program required that prospective 
homeowners be low- to moderate-income and in need of improved housing. It also 
required that they be able to complete the repairs required or be able to contract and pay 
for the work to be done. However, the main focus of the program was never to supply 
affordable homeownership opportunities so much as to occupy and rehabilitate vacant 
houses in distressed areas and thereby remove blighting influences in the neighborhoods, 
generate spin-off investments by other homeowners and promote the revitalization of 
urban core neighborhoods. 12 
Though popular in many circles, the program also generated criticism. Questions 
arose about whether the right properties and homeowners were being selected and 
whether the program was generating any spin-off private investment or neighborhood 
revitalization. 
Instructions for choosing properties outlined in a HUD guide for local Urban 
Homesteading officials illustrate these tensions: 
"This decision involves both practical and political considerations. The 
properties should not be so seriously deteriorated that the cost of 
rehabilitation is beyond the means oflower- or moderate-income 
homesteaders. At the same time, hom·esteading could be viewed as a 
giveaway program if properties required little or no repair, inviting political 
criticism of the program."13 
Analysis of the data collected from the demonstration program also pointed to 
issues surrounding the measurement of the program's success. One author found that the 
racial composition of the neighborhood and the larger housing market dynamics had a 
larger impact on the overall economic health of the area and private investment 
decisions. 14 
City programs 
A closer look at programs to rehabilitate vacant housing in mid-sized American 
cities revealed different approaches to working with non-profit CDCs and vacant housing. 
Table 2 presents a summary of the program characteristics in eight comparable cities. 
1
~ U.S. General Accounting Office. 
13 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Urban Homesteading: A Guide for local 
Officials. (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1987), 3. 
14 David Varady, Neighborhood Upgrading: A Realistic Assessment (Albam·: State Universitv of New 
York. 1986). · · 
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Property Acquisition 
Many options are available to a city in acquiring vacant property. Each has 
advantages and disadvantages in tenns of the amount of time required to acquire the 
property and the cost. Indianapolis has used eminent domain to acquire properties for 
non-profit rehabilitation. It does this by creating a "redevelopment area" and then 
working with the non-profit developers and neighborhood residents to identify problem 
properties for acquisition. Funds expended by the city in acquiring the property may 
lower the amount of remaining subsidy available for rehabilitation. 
Indianapolis also uses a receivership process when the owner of vacant land cannot 
be located. In this scenario, the city goes to court to have a non-profit developer named 
as receiver of the property to transfer ownership. If the owner resurfaces, the cost of any 
work completed on the project must be reimbursed before ownership is reclaimed. 15 
In Hartford, the city typically obtains the property through foreclosure or bank 
donation. If the city purchases the property it generally costs less than $20,000. In St. 
Louis, properties rehabilitated by non-profit developers are all owned by the city ( as 
opposed to HUD). They are properties transferred to the city by the tax forfeiture process 
or through condemnation and are sold to the non-profit developers for a nominal price. 16 
In Cincinnati, the city acquires properties through tax sale or buys them from 
HUD. They then sell the properties to the CDC's at the same price. The purpose of city 
intervention is to avoid problems with transfer of title. 17 
Suhsidy Levels 
As the method and cost of acquisition differs between cities, so does the overall 
gap subsidy level. Other cities generally do not have stated subsidy caps, but evaluate 
projects on a case-by-case basis. The levels of subsidies are the targets of political 
pressure in cities outside of St. Paul. In St. Louis decisions on the disposition of vacant 
property depend to some degree by ward on the preference of the aldennan. Attempts are 
made there to keep subsidy levels under $40,000 for single family homes, but that amount 
has come under criticism from people who prefer down payment assistance and moderate 
rehabilitation programs. 18 
Indianapolis is in the process of trying to set limits for rehabilitation costs. Staff is 
looking at both per unit limits and limits in costs per square foot. Typical gap subsidies at 
15 Sheri Kohlmeyer, Indianapolis Division of Economic and Housing Development, telephone 
conversation with author, 2 July 1996. 
16 Rick Bonnish, St. Louis Community Development Agency, telephone conversation with author, 2 July 
1996. 
17 Sara Martin, Cincinnati Department of Neighborhood Services, telephone conversation with author, 3 
July 1996. 
18 Bonnish. 
8 
present are approximately $15,000, but reductions in federal funding to the city may 
impact that figure. 19 In Cincinnati, on the other hand, a decision was made to avoid doing 
houses which could not be sold at a price to cover acquisition and rehabilitation costs. 20 
In Milwaukee the city limits project subsidies to $15,000 but this does not include 
the purchase price of the properties. 
Other program features 
Most of the cities utilize federal Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) 
funds, as well as funds from HUD's HOME program. Only two cities, Hartford and 
Portland use state funds. As a result, the programs have income limits for the participants 
who purchase the rehabilitated homes, though these limits vary from city to city. Finally, 
virtually all of the programs provide homeownership counseling to program participants 
and they typically require the purchasers to remain in the house for at least five years after 
purchasing the home. 
Market Corrections 
One of the most powerful tools for dealing with vacant housing may well be a 
strong housing market. Both Denver and Portland used various strategies based on 
federal funding to rehabilitate vacant housing in the past, but have scaled back efforts as 
the private market demand for housing increased. 21 Cities may not be able to control the 
private housing markets or direct population growth within their borders, but recognizing 
the importance of regional growth patterns and growth controls offers an opportunity for 
input. The demand for housing near the urban core, particularly in Portland, may be due 
to tight control of the urban growth boundary in that region. 
19 Kohlmever. 
w Martin.· 
~
1 David Sweet, Portland Buildings Bureau. telephone conversation with author 3 Julv 1996 and Susan 
Spinnel, Denver Community Development Housing Section. letter to author, 14' June ·1996. 
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T bl 2 V a e . acan ousme pro !!rams m compara e c1 1es. . th bl 'f 
City Funding Subsidy Acquisition Subsidy Average Income CDCs Coun- Occupancy 
Source Mechanism Process Limits Subsidy Limits Involved seling? Req.s? 
Amount 
Hartford CDBG, State of Fee simple, Tax $ I sales price. - Yes. & 1st No Yes 5 years 
CT., sweat transfer foreclosure. mortgage base time home-
equity property, 1st & HUDNAforc- on rehab buyers 
2nd mortgages closure. dona-
tion. purchase 
Milwaukee CDBG,HOME Construction Purchase $15,000 per unit $14,000 per Yes, 80% Yes Yes 5 years 
loan & 1st unit of median 
mortgage 
Indianapolis HOME Fee simple. I st Land $15,000 plus Yes Yes Yes 5 years 
mortgage utilization acquisition 
St. Louis HOME Fee simple. I st Tax $40,000 for $28,000 per Yes, 100% Yes Yes 5 years for 1-
mortgage foreclosure & rehab. $25,000 unit of area 4 units 
condemnation for new median 
Cincinnati CDBG. HOPE Low income Tax Equal to $20,000 per Yes,HOPE Yes Yes 3 years 
III loans foreclosure & appraised value unit Ill 
ourchase guidelines 
Omaha CDBG. HOME 2nd mortgage. Purchase $20,000 per unit $13,500 per Depends Yes No 10 years 
deferred loans unit upon loan 
source 
Portland CDBG. State I st or 2nd mort- Tax $20,000 per Federal Yes Yes 3 to 5 years 
funds gages foreclosure & unit pro-gram 
condemnation limits 
Cleveland CDBG,HOME, Lease purchase Direct $18,400 Y cs, federal Yes Yes 5 years 
LIHTC loans, 2nd mort- purchase by (HOME) program 
gages new owners $50,000 limits 
(LIHTC) 
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II. PROGRAM COSTS & BENEFITS 
METHODS 
When a house becomes vacant in St. Paul, one of three things occurs. First, the house can 
be rehabilitated through the Houses to Homes program. Second, if the house remains vacant for 
over 12 months, the city can move to have it demolished. A third potential outcome is that the 
vacant home can be reoccupied at any point by another tenant or the property owner. The three 
potential outcomes from housing vacancies are illustrated below in figure 2. In the following 
section we analyze the costs and benefits associated with each of the options pictured below. 
Figure 2: Outcomes of vacant homes in St. Paul since 1991. 
Vacant 
house 
Rehab 
(n=232) 
1---------____..Demolition 
(n=320) 
Reoccupation 
(n=1169) 
In the analysis that follows, we explicitly compare the costs and benefits to each of the 
three property dispositions. We examine the effects of each on property tax revenues for the city, 
nearby investment by neighbors, and costs to the city associated with police and citizen services. 
Other benefits examined include sales tax revenues and losses to property foreclosure. 
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Costs of Vacant Housing in St. Paul 
This section will look first at ways the costs associated with vacant housing play out 
locally and then tum to a closer look at costs and discussion of benefits related to the Houses to 
Homes program. 
Erosion of Property Tax Base 
Perhaps the most obvious cost of vacant housing or vacant lots is the immediate loss of 
tax base because of the depressed value of the property. While the average estimated value of 
homesteaded residences in 1989 was $67,584, vacant properties or vacant lots are valued at much 
lower, thereby lowering the property tax assessment. This is particularly important in St. Paul, 
because residential properties make up over 40 percent of the city's tax base, an amount which is 
increasing in relation to commercial and industrial properties and apartments. 22 
Secondary Impacts 011 Property Values 
In addition to the immediate loss in tax revenue from the vacant property, surrounding 
properties may also experience depressed values, resulting in lower tax revenues. Studies differ 
on the amount of the impact, but not on its existence. A National Association of Home Builders 
study based on figures from the 1991 and 1993 American Housing Surveys found that an 
abandoned building within 30 feet of a home in a Northeastern central city reduced the value of 
the home by over 30 percent.23 The Family Housing Fund of the Twin Cities reported that, based 
on real tors' experiences, houses on the same block as vacant properties show decreases in 
property values of$2,500 and more, while homes adjacent and across the street decrease $10,000 
in value.24 A study of property values in Minneapolis found that an abandoned housing building in 
a census tract lowers a property's value by $859.98.25 
Deterred Private Investment 
This loss in property value and uncertainty about the return may deter surrounding 
property owners from investing in maintenance or improvements to their properties. Property 
owners who decide to invest in their properties may find that they cannot secure private financing 
for the work because of their proximity to vacant buildings or the overall condition of the 
neighborhood. 
22 Greg Blees, City Council Fiscal Policy Director. Research presented at the Policy Session on Property Values of 
the St. Paul Citv Council, 15 Mav 1996. 
23 Paul Emrath: "Features that I~uence Home Values." Housing Economics, December 1995, 8. 
24 Ana Moreno. Cost Effectiveness of Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention. Family Housing Fund of Minneapolis 
and Saint Paul, November 1995, 16. 
25 Edward G. Goetz, Hin Kin Lam and Anne Heitlinger, There Goes the Neighborhood? The Impact of Subsidized 
lvlulti-Fami(v Housing on Urban Neighborhoods (Minneapolis: Center for Urban and Regional Affairs. 1996) 55. 
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Loss in Tax Revem,e from Tax Delinquent and Tax Forfeited Properties 
When homes are abandoned by their owners, they frequently become tax delinquent, as 
the cost of paying property taxes can exceed the value of the property. After the propeny goes 
into tax forfeiture, ownership is transferred to the state and any outstanding taxes must be written 
off. This is a direct loss to the city, county and school district. When the propeny is sold at tax 
auction, some of these revenues might be recouped, but only after paying for the county's 
administrative expenses and any outstanding assessments. If any of the proceeds are remaining 
(which is unlikely), they are divided between the three taxing entities, with the city receiving only 
40 percent of the total and the county and school board dividing the rest. 
Costs for Property Maintenance and Security 
Once a vacant propeny is identified by the city and placed on its Vacant Housing List, 
health inspectors visit the site every two months. As a result of these visits or in response to calls 
from concerned citizens, the city may perform maintenance tasks at the property, such as cutting 
the grass, picking up garbage or shoveling the sidewalk. Because of concerns to health or safety, 
the property might also be boarded up. The costs of these summary abatements are assessed to 
the property. At the end of the year, the assessments are certified to the owner's taxes, but if the 
owner is tax delinquent, they remain unpaid. Maintenance tasks might also fall to neighbors who 
do not wish to wait for the city to intervene. In addition to any costs incurred, it may add to their 
dissatisfaction with their neighborhood. 
Demolition Costs 
As is the case with summary abatements at vacant properties, abandoned houses may be 
demolished if they represent a significant health and safety hazard. The cost of the demolition is 
also assessed to the property owner, and one-tenth is certified to the property taxes every year if 
the total assessment is not paid in full. Like the other assessments, the cost of the demolition 
( several thousand dollars) may be lost if the owner is not paying property taxes. Any outstanding 
balance of the demolition or summary abatements must be paid by the city at the time a property 
is turned over to the state. These costs may be recouped by the city if the tax auction proceeds 
are sufficient to cover administrative costs incurred by the county with funds remaining. 
However, the county does not take the amount of outstanding assessments into account in setting 
the sales price of the tax forfeit property, and until recently, did not contact the city to find out the 
amount of outstanding assessments. 
Health and Safety Hazards 
In addition to maintenance costs, the city also incurs costs in responding to police, fire or 
complaint calls to the property. Each call generates a response where a city employee goes to the 
property and might perform a range of activities with varying expenses, from making a note in a 
file to putting out a fire. 
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For each of the cost categories described above, we are able to estimate the fiscal impact 
of rehabilitation. demolition. or private sector reoccupation of the vacant home. In a small 
number of cases, Houses to Homes has subsidized the complete demolition of a house and the 
new construction of a replacement house on the same site. These cases are included with the 
rehabilitation projects for the purpose of this report. In the analysis that follows we rely upon 
various assumptions and estimates to calculate costs and benefits. Thus, where appropriate we 
will provide a conservative, a mid-range, and a more generous estimate of the fiscal impacts we 
calculate. In addition to the impacts we calculate, there are other possible effects that, for various 
reasons, we do not estimate. A description of these impacts is provided below. 
Non-quantified impacts 
Income generation.from rehabilitation 
In the analysis below, we investigate the question of whether rehabilitation of a vacant 
home leads to spillover investment in nearby properties. We then go on to estimate what the 
increased property tax and sales tax revenues are from the upgrading of the housing stock that 
takes place after a Houses to Homes rehabilitation. We do not estimate, however, the increased 
disposable income generated by the construction jobs created by the Houses to Homes 
rehabilitation and the spillover investment. These benefits can be assumed to be significantly 
greater than zero and should be acknowledged when weighing the total impact of rehabilitation 
versus demolition or reoccupation. 
Loss of affordable homeownership opportunities 
Each vacant home represents an under-utilized element of the housing stock. 
Rehabilitation and resale of the home through Houses to Homes not only returns the house to the 
stock, but it also provides an income-qualified family with an opportunity to own a home. The 
benefits of providing affordable homeownership to families is not included in our analysis. 
Perceived Loss of Social Control 
Incidents occurring at vacant properties or vacant lots may exacerbate a feeling of 
dissatisfaction of residents with the neighborhood and hopelessness which accompanies the 
presence of vacant buildings. Because the vacant buildings are concentrated in low-income areas, 
they are both indications and reflections of other social problems. Rehabilitation, demolition, and 
reoccupation may have varying impact on the degree to which this problem is mitigated. The 
difficulties of measuring these effects preclude our including them in the present analysis. 
Harm to Overall Physical Appearance 
The presence of a vacant building may influence the attitudes of residents or outsiders in judging 
the attractiveness of a neighborhood as a place to live, visit or do business. It is conceivable that 
rehabilitation, demolition, and reoccupation may have differential impact on aesthetic judgments 
of the neighborhood. To the extent that these judgments affect future locational decisions, 
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including decisions to locate new businesses and employment opportunities nearby, they may have 
a very real impact on the health of the neighborhood. Constraints of time and resources kept us 
from collecting data on this issue. 
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FINDINGS 
Direct property value benefit 
In this section we estimate the average property tax revenues produced by properties in 
each of the three disposition categories - rehabilitation, demolition, and reoccupation. after each 
of the three dispositions. First, we estimate that properties rehabilitated through Houses to 
Homes will be valued at their average sales price, $68, 894. Demolished properties will be valued 
at an average of $6,0 I 0. This average was obtained from data on demolished properties in St. 
Paul, obtained from the St. Paul Department of Planning and Economic Development (PED). 
Finally, we assume that the reoccupied units are valued at $29,618. This estimate was obtained 
by using the average acquisition price paid through the Houses to Homes program. That is, this 
was the value of homes that had been vacant prior to their being rehabilitated. 
Calculation of benefits 
In order to estimate the public revenue, we apply property tax rates as paid by property 
owners in St. Paul. Property tax is levied against 1% of the first $72,000 of value. The levy rate 
is 153. 09%. Thus, we use the following equation to determine the property tax revenue to the 
city: 
Revenue= Value* .01 * 1.5309 
We then take the revenue figures and carry them out over 20 years, and calculate the 
discounted present value of that revenue stream. Based on the the cost of capital to the city (i.e., 
the municipal bond rate at a 20 year term) we use a 5% discount rate. 26 The discounted present 
value of 20 years of property tax revenue from a rehabilitated home is $13,145. This compares to 
$1.148 for demolished properties and $5,650 for reoccupied homes. 
In addition to these total figures. we can calculate what St. Paul's portion of the tax 
revenues would be by multiplying the figures above by (. 4 ), because the City receives 40% of 
property tax revenues. The discounted present value of the direct revenue to the city is $5,258 
under rehabilitation, $459 for a demolition, and $2,260 for reoccupation. 
Indirect property value benefit 
Proponents of housing rehabilitation programs claim that rehabilitation not only improves 
the quality (and therefore market value) of the house rehabilitated, but it also increases nearby 
property values, enhancing the market value of the entire neighborhood. As described earlier, an 
abandoned house can decrease nearby property values by many thousands of dollars. The higher 
market values generated by rehabilitation are reflected in higher tax assessments, providing local 
government with greater property tax revenues. In this section, we analyze the degree to which 
this scenario plays out in the St. Paul Houses to Homes program. 
26 According to Shirley Davis. the Treasurer of St. Paul. the most recent bond rate paid by the city was 4.89%. 
Thus. a 5% discount rate actually slightly underestimates the current present value. 
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Ana{vsis of impacts 
In order to estimate the impact of rehabilitation, demolition, and reoccupation on nearby 
property values, we constructed a hedonic price model of residential properties in St. Paul. We 
collected data from the County Assessor's office for every residential property in the city. These 
data provide information on the housing structure and the property lot. This allowed us to take 
account of characteristics such as lot size, number of bedrooms, bathrooms, existence of a 
fireplace, porch, garage, and other features that help determine housing value. To those structural 
characteristics we added neighborhood "dummy" variables.27 The County Assessor's office 
divides the city into 22 neighborhoods that they define as separate housing submarkets. These 
dummy variables allow us to take into account a range of neighborhood-level demographic and 
market characteristics that may also affect property values. To the structural and neighborhood 
variables we added one more set of variables; the number of Houses to Homes rehabilitations, 
demolitions, and reoccupations that took place on the same block as the property in question. 
These last variables are the ones in which we are most interested. The coefficients for these 
variables tell us what impact these different dispositions have had on property values. The 
dependent variable for this analysis is the most recent sales price of the house as recorded in the 
Assessor's data. 
We restricted the sample to houses that were on a block that had a vacant property. In 
addition, because our dependent variable was sales price, we eliminated those properties that sold 
he.fore the rehabilitation, demolition, or reoccupation took place. These two restrictions resulted 
in a sample size of 1713 properties. Table 3 presents the findings from this analysis. 
The coefficients listed in table 3 are interpreted as being the amount of increase or 
decrease in property value associated with a change of a single unit in the independent variable. 
For example, the first variable listed in the table is "Single family home." This variable is coded 
"1" for those properties that are single family homes, and "0" for properties that are not. Thus, 
the coefficient indicates that all other things being equal and controlled for, the single family 
homes in this sample of homes average $11,805 more in value than other types of homes. 
Similarly, those with a garage average $6,161 more in value than those without a garage, other 
things being held constant. The coefficients for the three variables of interest reveal that 
demolition and reoccupation had significant negative effects on the property values of other 
homes on the block (b= -1300.51 and b= - 1191.05, respectively). The coefficient for 
rehabilitation is also negative, but not statistically significant. This means that there is no reliable 
statistical impact of rehabilitation on nearby property values; values tend to remain essentially 
stable on blocks with rehabs. Recall that our sample is only those blocks with a vacant house; 
these blocks are typically going to be troubled areas with stagnant or declining values. This 
analysis suggests that demolition and reoccupation hasten the decline of nearby values, while 
rehabilitation stabilizes values of other houses in these areas. 
:, Dummy variables take on the value of O or 1. indicating the presence of a characteristic, or its absence. In this 
analysis. we include 22 separate dummy variables, each indicating whether a property is located in the 
neighborhood or not. For properties located in neighborhood 7, for example, the value of the dummy variable 
"NbhdT' equals I. and the values for all of the other "Nbhd_" variables is coded 0. 
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Table 3: Impact of the Houses to Homes program on property values - hedonic price model 
Variable Coefficient Probabilitv 
.000 
.000 
Single family home 11805 
Condition 16041 
Garage 6161 .000 
Pool 16505 .126 
Lot area 1.067 .000 
Total lot area 23.37 .000 
Number of bedrooms -277 .561 
Number of bathrooms 310 .729 
Fireplace 4506 .002 
Ageofhouse -236 .000 
Homesteaded property 10143 .000 
Enclosed porch -2.217 .588 
Deck area 26.15 .002 
Neighborhood l 55193 .000 
Neighborhood 3 29117 .001 
Neighborhood 4 7797 .000 
Neighborhood 5 4305 .452 
Neighborhood 6 -1694 .346 
Neighborhood 7 2173 .195 
Neighborhood 8 4719 .004 
Neighborhood I 0 9304 .001 
Neighborhood 11 5718 .003 
Neighborhood 12 4860 .007 
Neighborhood 13 1715 .686 
Neighborhood 15 3255 .080 
Neighborhood 17 20761 .000 
Neighborhood 18 19375 .192 
Neighborhood 19 2856 .131 
Neighborhood 20 13160 .000 
Neighborhood 21 29796 .001 
Neighborhood 22 36677 .000 
Neighborhood 24 23732 .000 
Neighborhood 86 -3537 .000 
Neighborhood 110 885 .655 
Rehabilitation -498.34 .330 
Demolition -1300.51 .029 
Reoccupation -1191.05 .001 
constant 10480 .001 
Adjusted R2 .5838 
N= 1713 
F= 63.51 .000 
Thus, in comparison with the other two dispositions, rehabilitation provides benefits to the 
city, in terms of property tax revenues that would have been lost had the city followed one of the 
other two strategies. Below, we estimate the magnitude of this benefit. 
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Calculation of benefits 
To produce an estimate of the impact of Houses to Homes activity on property values, we 
multiply the coefficients for demolition and reoccupation by 13 in order to get the total increment 
in value for the entire block. (According to the data we collected to analyze the spillover 
investment occurring in neighborhoods with a Houses to Homes rehabilitation, we found that the 
average St. Paul block face has 14 homes.) Most analyses of this type show that property value 
effects of certain land uses have an impact for at least one-eighth of a mile in each direction. 
Thereafter the effect diminishes until disappearing outside of three-quarters of a mile or one mile. 
In this analysis, we assume that the effect we saw for the block face reduces by 50% for the eight 
surrounding blocks and again by 50% (to 25% ofits original impact) for the next ring of(l6) 
blocks before disappearing. 
Two things should be noted about our assumptions regarding the extent of the effects we 
found in the hedonic model. First, in a central city such as St. Paul, it is generally the case that 
two rings of city blocks will be less than one-eighth of a mile from the core block. Thus, on the 
whole our estimate appears conservative. Second, because our estimate is not based on data 
analysis we have chosen to investigate a range of estimates. The assumption described above will 
serve as the basis for our mid-range estimate. An even more conservative estimate would have 
the property value impact disappearing after the first ring of block. Thus, we made calculations 
based on the assumption that the effect diminishes by 50% for the first block and then disappears. 
Our high range estimate is based on a more generous assumption about the property value impact 
of demolitions and reoccupations. That is, for the high end calculations we assumed that the 
impact reduces to 67% of the original size for the first ring of blocks and then reduces to 33% of 
the original for the second ring of blocks. Our calculations are described in the following manner: 
Low estimate: A= (b*13) + (b*l4*.5*8) 
Mid-range estimate: A= (b*13) + (b*l4*.5*8) + (b*l4*.25* 16) 
High estimate: A= (b*l3) + (b*l4*.67*8) + (b*l4*.33*16), 
where A is the estimated aggregate property value change in the neighborhood, and b is the 
coefficient in the hedonic model for the demolition and reoccupation variables. 
This value, A, is then multiplied by the property tax rate to determine the increment in tax 
revenues for a given year. We extrapolate the findings over 20 years and calculate the discounted 
present value. This process produces the estimated public sector costs shown in table 4. 
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Table 4· Estimated indirect propertv value impacts . . . 
Rehab Demo Reocc 
Low Mid High Low Mid Hiizh Low Mid High 
Total 
fiscal 0 0 0 -$14,570 -$26,397 -$34,202 -$13,340 -$24,165 -$31,310 
impacts 
City 
fiscal 0 0 0 -$5,828 -$10,559 -$13,681 -$5.336 -$9.666 -$12.524 
impacts 
Spillover investment benefits 
It is possible that rehabilitation and demolition may have differential impact on the 
propensity of neighbors to invest in their own homes. Demolition, for example, may signal to 
nearby property owners that there is little interest in maintaining the housing stock in the 
neighborhood and may make them less likely to invest in their own properties. Theoretically, we 
expect rehabilitation to have the opposite effect. That is, we expect that rehabilitation sends a 
signal to neighbors that the area is worth investing in and that neighbors are making the 
investments_necessary to maintain the housing stock. This could increase a household's 
willingness to make investments in their own housing. In this section of the report we analyze this 
issue and attempt to quantify the degree to which these effects occur. · 
Ana~vsis <?{spillover impacts 
In order to test for the impact of rehabilitation, demolition, and reoccupation on nearby 
investment we collected data on the number and amount of construction permits pulled from 1986 
to 1996. We proceeded in the following way: 
A) We chose the block face (a block of houses facing the same street) as our unit of analysis. 
B) We identified blocks where only one of the three possible dispositions occurred. That is, we 
identified all of the blocks where only a rehabilitation took place, without any demolition or 
reoccupation. Then we identified the blocks in which only demolitions took place, without 
any rehabilitation or reoccupation. We repeated the process for reoccupations. 
C) We then chose a random sample of25 blocks in each category. 
D) Data on the number of houses on the block, the number of construction permits pulled, and 
the total value of the permits pulled were collected (excluding the address at which the 
rehabilitation took place) for each year from 1986 to 1996. 
E) We controlled for the number of houses on the block by computing the mean permit value per 
house. This variable was used as the dependent variable in our analysis. 
F) We used an interrupted time series technique to determine the impact of rehabilitation, 
demolition, and reoccupation on mean permit value. We constructed a separate equation for 
each of the three disposition categories. By comparing the statistical findings across these 
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equations we can estimate the differential impact of the dispositions on nearby property 
investment. 
The statistical analysis produced findings summarized in table 5. Of the three dispositions, 
only rehabilitation has a statistically significant impact on nearby property investment. The 
coefficient in the upper left comer indicates that rehabilitation results in an increase of $713.54 of 
investment per house per year. The coefficients for demolition and reoccupation are negative, 
suggesting that these dispositions actually reduce nearby investment. But, because these 
coefficients are not statistically significant, we conclude that there is actually no reliable impact on 
investment of these two dispositions. In addition, the statistics show that on the rehabilitation 
blocks, investment was decreasing by an average of$97.37 per house per year prior to the 
rehabilitation (see the pre-intervention trend coefficient). The trend after the rehab is not 
statistically significant, thus we assume it is even. Taken together this means that the 
rehabilitation not only increased the average level ofinvestment on the blocks we studied, but it 
also arrested a downward slide on those blocks. 
Table 5: The impact of rehabilitation, demolition, and reoccupation on nearby property 
investment: Interrupted time series analysis. 
Eq. I Eq. 2 Eq. 3 
Rehab Demo Reocc 
Change in level 713.54 * -658.12 -16.99 
Pre-intervention trend -97.37 * 204.80 -52.52 
Post-intervention trend -15.73 -351.78 136.43 
*p<.10 
This process is illustrated in figure 3 below. Line a-b represents the pre-rehabilitation trend in 
nearby investment. There is a slight downward slope. Line b-c represents the impact of the 
rehabilitation on the level of investment taking place in the neighborhood ( estimated by the 
coefficient of713.54 more investment per house per year). Line c-d is the post-rehabilitation 
trend. It is, according to the findings shown in table 5, not statistically different than O. Finally, 
line b-e represents the level of investment that would have taken place in the absence of the 
rehabilitation. Thus, the sum of the impact of rehabilitation on nearby investment is the area 
between points d and e. 
Thus, we calculate that the per house impact of rehabilitation in the first year is an increase 
of $713.54 plus an additional $97.37 (a total of$810.91). · For each subsequent year this total 
increases by $97.37 (the amount of decline that would have occurred without the rehabilitation). 
We can now use these estimated figures to calculate the increased tax revenue generated by the 
increased private sector investment in neighborhoods experiencing a rehabilitation. 
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Figure 2: The impact of rehabilitation on nearby property investment. 
a 
Calculations <?f benefits 
-- ..... 
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intervention point 
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We make two adjustments to these figures before we calculate the net present value of this 
revenue stream. First, it is the case that investment does not translate into market value on a 
dollar for dollar basis. According to the estimates of nonprofit community developers who work 
in the neighborhoods affected by the St. Paul Houses to Homes program, only 30% of investment 
translates td market value.28 Thus, our first adjustment to the figures is to reduce them to 30% of 
their estimated value. 
Second, it is the case that not all private investment is reflected in the permit data. Indeed, 
there are reasons to suspect a rather large underestimation of the total amount of private 
investment that takes place. To the extent that permits take time, cost money, and might result in 
city inspections and plan checks, some property owners may wish to avoid the entire process, if 
possible. The City's Building Inspections Division estimates that permits may undercount actual 
private investment by as much as 30%.29 Thus, the second adjustment is to increase our figures 
by 30%. 
After these adjustments, we make calculations that are similar to the ones made in the 
property values analysis in the preceding section. That is, we assume that the impact of the 
spillover private investment reduces by half for the surrounding eight blocks, and again by half for 
the second ring of 16 blocks. Then we apply the tax rate to the amount. The steps are listed 
below: 
A) Take the year one increment in average permit value of $810.91 ($713.54 + $97.37). This 
figure increases each year by $97.37. 
28 Estimate obtained at a meeting of the St. Paul Community Development Coalition, Wednesday, October 2, 1996. 
29 Communication from Marcia Moermoncl Senior Researcher, St. Paul City Council Research, January 7, 1997. 
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B) Because the average block in the sample has 14 homes, multiply (A) by 13 (14 minus the 
house rehabbed through Houses to Homes). This provides the increase in permit value on the 
entire block due to the rehabilitation. 
C) Multiply (A) by 14 to get the total for the surrounding blocks. The multiply by .5 and then by 
8, because the magnitude of the spillover investment reduces by half for the surrounding 
blocks. 
D) Multiply (A) by 14 * .25 * 16 to account for the magnitude of the spillover investment in the 
second ring of blocks. 
E) Add (B) (C) and (D) to get the total increment in permit value. 
F) Multiply (E) by .3, because only 30% of permit value translates to market value. 
G) Multiply (F) by 1.3 because the number of permits pulled underestimates actual private 
investment by 30%. 
H) Multiply (G) by .01 *1.5309 in order to determine the tax revenue. 
I) Repeat this for each of the 20 years (this is necessary because (A) above changes each year). 
J) Determine the net present value of this revenue stream, at 5% discount rate. 
These steps provide us with the discounted present value of$13,507. That is, a single 
rehabilitation results in nearby property investment that yields $13,507 in tax revenue over a 20-
year period discounted to present value. 
As in the calculations of the indirect property tax revenues, we provide both a range of 
estimates as well as the city of St. Paul's portion of the revenues. To calculate a low range 
estimate we assume, as we did in the previous analysis, that the spillover impact might extend as 
little as only one block surrounding the property. For our high range estimate we assumed, as 
before, that the magnitude of the effect would decrease to 67% ofits original value for the 
surrounding block and then to 33% ofits original value for the second ring of blocks. Our range 
of estimates. along with the calculation of city revenues are shown in table 6 below. 
Table 6: Estimated spillover investment impacts. 
Rehab Demo Reocc 
- Low Mid High Low Mid High Low Mid High 
Total fiscal $7,457 $13,507 $17,502 0 0 0 0 0 0 
impacts 
City fiscal $2,983 $5,403 $7,001 0 0 0 0 0 0 
impacts 
Our calculations suggest that the discounted present value of the total public fiscal benefits 
due to the spillover investment generated by a Houses to Homes rehabilitation project range from 
a low of$7,457 to as much as $17,502. The City of St. Paul directly receives from $2,983 to 
$7,001 of those benefits. There are no similar benefits from either a demolition or a reoccupation. 
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Additional rehabilitation benefits - sales tax revenue 
In this section we quantify an additional source ofrevenue to the city of St. Paul, based on 
the estimated sales tax revenue generated by rehabilitation activity. The sales tax revenue would 
come from two sources, the materials and supplies used in the construction job itself that are 
bought in St. Paul, and more indirectly, through the enhanced income of construction workers 
who are St. Paul residents and who make purchase_s in the city. 
For the purposes of this analysis, we estimate only the direct generation of sales tax 
revenue through the purchase of construction materials for the Houses to Homes rehabilitation 
projects, and for the spillover private investment that takes place as a result of Houses to Homes 
rehabilitation projects. In order to calculate the benefits, we use the analysis of spillover 
investment to produce estimates of the amount of construction work produced by HOUSES TO 
HOMES rehabs, demolitions, and reoccupations. Recall that the investment analysis indicated 
that only rehabilitation resulted in a net increase in spillover investment. The increase was in the 
amount of $713 per house per year and an additional $97 per year (because the declining pre-
rehab trend was stabilized by the intervention). 
Calculation of benefits 
Using the mid-range estimate of spillover investment produced in the previous analysis, we 
calculate the sales tax revenues to the city from material purchased as a result of this construction 
work. We assume, as we did in the analysis of spillover investment, that permits undercount the 
actual amount of work done by 30%. We also use as a mid-range assumption that 30% of the 
cost of rehabilitation goes to materials.3° Calculating the 7% sales tax on the materials purchased 
in the spillover investment induced by a Houses to Homes rehab produces a very large net public 
sector benefit of $67,211. There are two reasons why this benefit seems so large compared to the 
property tax revenues examined in the previous analyses. First, the tax is applied to the total 
increment in materials expenditures whereas property taxes are applied on only 1 % of the value of 
houses. Second, the property tax impact of spillover investment is significantly reduced by the 
fact that only 30% of the value of the rehabilitation work translates into market value. Neither of 
these important reductions apply to sales tax where the tax of 7% is applied to every cent spent 
on rehabilitation work. 
Table 7: Sales tax revenues from the estimated spillover investment. 
Rehab Demo 
Low Mid High Low Mid High 
Tot-al fiscal $56.009 $67,211 $78.413 0 0 0 
imoacts 
City fiscal $2,801 $3,361 $3.921 0 0 0 
imnacts 
30 Estimates obtained from Ed Johnson, West Seventh Street Community Federation. 
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Reocc 
Low Mid High 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
Table 7 reveals very large public benefits from sales tax revenues that result from the 
spillover investment after a Houses to Homes rehab. At the same time, only a very small 
percentage of those benefits go directly to the City of St. Paul. In order to calculate St. Paul's 
portion of the sales tax revenues we first assumed that only 70% of the construction materials 
purchased for the spillover investment projects were purchased in St. Paul. We then took that 
amount and applied to it the½ of one percent share of the sales tax that goes directly to the city. 
Property maintenance costs 
In this analysis we determine the degree to which rehabilitation, demolition, or 
reoccupation affect the cost of citizen services at previously vacant residential properties. In 
order to estimate whether the type of disposition affects the number of citizen service calls made 
to a property, we employ an interrupted time series model, with the disposition as the intervention 
point. We collected data on the monthly number of citizen service calls at randomly selected 
properties (25 in each disposition category) since 1990. Using a Poisson time series regression 
model we are able to quantify the degree to which each of these dispositions affect the need for 
citizen services. 31 We computed separate models for each disposition. The findings are 
summarized in table 8. 
Table 8: Poisson time series analysis of Citizen Service calls for rehabilitation, demolition, 
and reoccupation. 
Change in level 
Pre-intervention trend 
. 
Post-intervention trend 
-------------
Ratio of post- to 
pre-intervention mean 
** p< .05 
*** p < .01 
-1.14** 
.04*** 
-.04** 
.134 
-.804** -.174 
.029 *** .052*** 
-.025** -.074*** 
.447 .839 
The data show that both rehabilitation and demolition significantly reduce the number of 
monthly calls for citizen services. That is, the coefficient for "change in level" for both 
rehabilitation and demolition is statistically significant and negative in direction. Though the 
31 A Poisson method is a form of non-linear estimation that is appropriate when the dependent variable is restricted 
in range to positive integers. The count-data that we have collected on public health calls and police calls 
(described in the following section) make the Poisson regression the preferred model. The coefficients produced by 
the model cannot be given the same interpretation as those produced by simple time series models. 
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coefficients in a Poisson regression cannot be interpreted in the same manner as a simple 
interrupted time series analysis, it is possible to compute the change in intercept as a percentage 
reduction in the pre-intervention mean. Thus, the data show that rehabilitation reduces the calls 
to 13.4% of their pre-intervention level, while demolition reduces calls to 44. 7% of pre-
intervention levels. The coefficient for the reoccupation equation is not significant, indicating that 
there is no statistically reliable effect of reoccupation on the level of citizen service calls. Though 
both rehab and demolition reduce service calls, rehabilitation reduces calls by a greater amount. 
According to our estimates,32 the cost to the city for public health inspections is $40.77 
per call and vacant houses are inspected an average of 16 times per year. We will use these 
estimates to produce a cost estimate for citizen service calls because the majority of the citizen 
service calls are public health related.33 We produce a cost savings estimate in the following 
manner: 
A) The average vacant home is inspected 16 times per year for a total cost of$652.32 
( 16*$40. 77). 
B) After rehab those numbers are 2.14 inspections per year (16* .134) for $87.25. 
C) After demolition the numbers convert to 7.15 per year (16*.447) and $291.50. 
D) For reoccupation the numbers remain the same: 16 inspection per year for $652.32. 
The annual savings are simply $652.32 minus the estimated post-intervention costs. For 
rehabilitation the savings are $565.07 per year. For demolition the savings are $360.82. Minute 
adjustments to these numbers needed to be made to account for the slight upward trend in calls 
prior to the intervention for both rehab and demolition, and the slight downward trend after the 
intervention in both cases.34 Over a 20 year period the discounted present value of these savings 
are $7 .141 for rehabilitation and $4,697 for demolition. All of these savings accrue to the City of 
St. Paul. 
3: The cost per inspection is based on a projection of the number of inspections in 1995, the number of vacant 
buildings monitored in 1995 and the three budget lines related to monitoring housing in the city. According to 
information given to the City Council Research Office by the Department of Public Health, there were a total of 
34.852 inspections in 1995. The budgets for vacant building monitoring. housing inspection. and nuisance 
buildings abatement were combined to estimate the total amount spent on monitoring all housing units in the city. 
This total of$ 1,421,062 was divided by 34,852 to estimate the cost per inspection for any housing unit. 
33 Communication with M. Moermond, St. Paul City Council Research Office. 
34 Table 8 indicates that there were slight slopes in the pre- and post-intervention trends for reoccupation. but that 
the intervention did not significantly alter the level of calls at those properties. By calculating the partial 
derivatives of the expected values we are able to produce coefficients that can be interpreted as the amount of 
change in the dependent variable given a one-unit change in the independent variable. Though the pre- and post-
intervention trends were incorporated into the estimates of the impact of rehabilitation and demolition. the 
magnitude of the partial derivatives for reoccupation are so small that we assumed the impact of the trend changes 
would be negligible. 
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Police Costs 
In this section we estimate the savings to the city in the police costs associated with 
servicing vacant and abandoned houses. As several studies show, vacant housing is often the 
location of illegal activities and, as such, can be a burden not only to the neighborhood, but to a 
city's police department in terms of the time and expense of responding to calls. 
Analysis of impact 
We collected data on monthly police calls at all of the addresses of properties involved in 
the Houses to Homes program. The police data date back to January 1990 and run through July 
1996. We utilized a Poisson time series analysis using the date of disposition (the month the 
property was either rehabbed, demolished, or reoccupied) as the intervention point. Such an 
analysis provides estimates of how much change occurred in the number of police calls after the 
disposition of the property. By running separate equations for properties that were rehabbed, 
demolished and reoccupied, it is possible to estimate the impact of each of the interventions. The 
analyses were done on random samples of25 properties in each category. 
Table 9: Poisson time series analysis of police calls at rehabilitated, demolished and 
reoccupied properties. 
Change in level 
Pre-intervention trend 
Post-interventio11 trend 
-----------------
Ratio of Post- to 
pre-intervention mean 
*p<.10 
** p< .OS 
*** p < .01 
-.207 
.002 
-.009 
.812 
-3.259*** 
-.022 
.033* 
.038 
.143 
-.004 
-.024** 
1. 15 
The time series analysis produced the findings, summarized in table 9. Only demolition of 
a property significantly changed the number of police calls occurring at the properties studied. 
Demolition reduced the number of police calls at properties by 96 percent. That is, the post-
demolition level of police calls was only 3.8 percent that of the pre-demolition level. 
Rehabilitation and Reoccupation did not significantly alter t~e level of police activity at properties. 
These findings are somewhat to be expected given that after a demolition there is no structure to 
play host to illegal or suspicious activity, thus calls to the property are likely to reduce. Perhaps 
more important, when the structure is gone there is no readily observable address to be used as a 
reference when making a police call. This, too, may reduce the number of calls to a property, 
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irrespective of the amount of criminal activity taking place. Nevertheless, it is also the case that 
rehabilitation and reoccupation had no impact on crime calls at the properties studies. 
Calculation of benefits 
Using the percentage reduction in police calls due to demolition it is now possible to 
estimate the cost savings to the city. According to city budget figures, the cost to respond to the 
average police call is $115.35 The pre-demolition average for police calls was .276 per month. 
That is, the 25 properties in our random sample received an average of .276 calls per month prior 
to their being demolished. This equates to 3.312 calls per year (.276*12), or a cost of $380.88 
per year (3.312*$115). If demolition reduces the number of calls to 3.8% of their pre-demolition 
level, we would expect only .126 calls per year at demolished sites (3.312*.038). This equates to 
a cost of $14.49 per address, per year, after de~olition. The difference between $380.88 and 
$14.49 represents the annual savings to the city; $366.39. To these amounts we made slight 
adjustments for the post-intervention trends shown in table 9 for demolition and reoccupation. 
Extrapolating this over 20 years and taking the net present value produces a discounted present 
value of the police savings of$4,169 per demolition and $735 per reoccupation. Rehabilitation 
did not alter the level or trend of police calls at the addresses we studied. 
Foreclosure losses 
Frequently, demolished properties fall into tax delinquency and ultimately tax foreclosure. 
When this occurs, the property is sold at auction and the county and city recoup whatever costs 
they can from the sale of the property. Sales prices, however, infrequently cover the actual costs 
of back taxes and accrued assessments. Thus, for each property demolished there is a risk of 
significant loss to the city. In this section we analyze this question and, based on city data, assign 
an average loss amount to each demolition that occurs in the city. 
When a demolished property goes into tax default. the owed taxes and interest accumulate 
on the tax bill for the property each year. In addition to back taxes, however, the city can add 
additional assessments as they occur. For example, if the city is called to the property to address 
a public health issue, or should the city be called to cut the grass or maintain the property in some 
other way, the cost of that service is added as an assessment to the tax bill. Actual foreclosure 
does not take place until the property has been delinquent for five years. At that point, the county 
can proceed with foreclosure actions and ultimately offer the property for sale at auction. At the 
sale of the property, the county takes its administrative costs out of the proceeds first, after which 
the county, the city, and the school district take their share of the back taxes. If there are left over 
proceeds from the sale, the city can then recover its assessments. The St. Paul City Council 
Research staff estimate that the city recovers only 17% of all of its costs (including tax revenue) 
from the average foreclosure sale. 
35 The information on the cost per police call is as reported by the police department's operations division for the 
1996 budget. It is listed as the 1995 estimated patrol cost per call. 
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Using a current list of demolished homes in St. Paul, we are able to estimate the average 
assessment balance of properties in foreclosure. The data we were provided by St. Paul PED 
included data on 300 demolished homes. Of those 300, 14 had been delinquent for at least five 
years (some were delinquent as many as seven years, indicating that the county does not always 
get around to proceeding with the foreclosure sale in year five). We calculated the average 
accumulated tax bill in the following manner: 
A) Using those properties in the data base that had been in default at least five years, we 
calculated that on the average they had been demolished in the fourth year of delinquency and 
had been delinquent an average of six years. 
B) Assuming an average property value of$29,618 for an abandoned house (this estimate comes 
from the average purchase price to the city of a Houses to Homes property), we calculated 
four years worth of back taxes and interest. 
C) Assuming an average property value of$6,010 for a vacant lot we calculated an additional 
two years worth of back taxes and interest (based on this reduced value of the property). 
D) We added (B) and (C) to get the total owed in taxes. The difference between this sum and the 
total payable ( an average of $13,157 for the properties in the data base) is the various 
additional assessments to the property made by the city. To that amount we added the 
average demolition cost ($9,500) to calculate the total assessments and back taxes owed on 
the foreclosed properties. We then calculated the discounted present value of that six year 
stream of uncollected revenues. 
E) Assuming that the city was entitled to 40% of the back taxes and 1 00% of the rest of the 
assessments, we calculated the net potential loss to the city for each foreclosed property. 
F) We multiplied (E) by the total number of foreclosed properties in the data base to get the 
aggregate potential loss to the city. -
G) According to city estimates, the city reclaims only 17% of its costs in tax foreclosure cases, 
losing the other 83%. Thus we multiplied (F) by .83 to calculate the actual aggregate loss to 
the city. · 
H) We divided (G) by the total number of demolished properties in the data base to compute the 
average cost per demolition. 
These calculations produced a mid-range estimate of $7,789 in losses for each demolition. 
We produced a high- and low-range estimate for these costs by altering the percentage of 
properties that would end up in foreclosure. Our data base indicated that 38% of the properties 
being tracked by the city had already gone to foreclosure. The rest of the properties were in 
default but had not reached foreclosure. Thus, we used three alternative figures to estimate how 
many of the remaining properties would end up in foreclosure. For our mid-range estimate we 
used 25%. Our conservative estimate was 10%, and our high-range estimate was 40%. These 
adjustments produced a low-range estimate of$6,612 in losses per demolition, and a high-range 
estimate of $8,921. 
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Table 10: Balance sheet of total public sector costs and benefits to rehabilitation, demolition, and reoccupation. 
Category Rehab Demo Reocc 
low med high low med high low med high 
Program 
Costs -$41,999 -$41,999 -$41,999 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Direct property value 
impacts $13,145 $13,145 $13,145 $1,148 $1,148 $), 148 $5,650 $5,650 $5,650 
Indirect property value 
impacts $0 $0 $0 -$14,570 -$26,397 -$34,202 -$13,340 -$24,165 -$31,310 
Spillover investment 
impacts $7,457 $13,507 $17,502 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Sales tax 
revenue $56,009 $67,211 $78,413 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Property maintenance 
costs $7,141 $7,141 $7,141 $4,697 $4,697 $4,697 $0 $0 $0 
Police service costs 
$0 $0 $0 $4,169 $4,169 $4,169 $0 $0 $0 
Foreclosure 
losses $0 $0 $0 -$6,827 -$8,043 -$9,212 $0 $0 $0 
TOTAL $41,753 $59,005 $74,202 -$11,383 -$24,426 -$33,400 -$6,955 -$17,780 -$24,925 
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Table 11: Balance sheet of City of St. Paul costs and benefits to rehabilitation, demolition, and reoccupation. 
Category Rehab ,Demo Reocc 
low med high low med high low med high 
Program 
Costs -$41,999 -$41,999 -$4 I ,999 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Direct property value 
impacts $5,258 $5,258 $5,258 $459 $459 $459 $2,260 $2,260 $2,260 
Indirect property value 
impacts $0 $0 $0 -$5,828 
-$10,559 -$13,681 -$5,336 -$9,666 -$12,524 
Spillover investment impacts 
$2,983 $5,403 $7,001 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Sales tax 
revenue $2,80 I $3,361 $3,921 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Property maintenance costs 
$7,141 $7,141 $7,141 $4,697 $4,697 $4,697 $0 $0 $0 
Police service costs 
$0 $0 $0 $4,169 $4,169 $4,169 $0 $0 $0 
Foreclosure 
losses $0 $0 $0 -$6,827 -$8,043 -$9,212 $0 $0 $0 
TOTAL -$23,816 -$20,836 -$18,678 -$3,330 -$9,277 -$13,568 -$2,341 -$6,671 -$9,524 
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Ill. CONCLUSION 
In this report we have estimated the fiscal costs and benefits related to three different 
vacant housing strategies. The data show that rehabilitation has very real public sector benefits, 
benefits that increase when compared with demolition or reoccupation. Demolition and 
reoccupation are associated with lower nearby property values. This is consistent with other 
research that shows that vacant properties have a deflating effect on nearby property values. Over 
the long term, this impact can amount to a sizable stream of revenue that a city foregoes because 
of the choice to demolish or do nothing about the vacant property. Rehabilitation also spurs 
nearby property owners to invest in their own homes. The very visible signs oflarge scale public 
sector rehabilitation in a neighborhood apparently act as signals to other owners that encourages 
their own investments. This spillover investment, over a long period of time represents a sizable 
amount of private investment. Given estimates about how much of that investment represents 
building and construction materials, the sales tax revenue generated from building materials 
expenditures, by itself, is enough to cover the average Houses to Homes project subsidy. 
Rehabilitation of vacant homes also provides net benefits in the form of reduced costs to the city 
of public health and property maintenance services. Finally, demolition presents real costs to the 
city due to the high rate of tax foreclosure for those properties demolished. The single cost 
category for which rehabilitation did not show superior savings was in police service. Both 
demolition and reoccupation reduced public sector costs in those areas, while rehabilitation did 
not 
Significantly, however, not all of the benefits of rehabilitation are captured by the city. 
Most of the sales tax revenue goes to the state, while the county and school district shares in the 
property tax revenues. When the analysis focuses on city benefits only, the rehabilitation strategy 
is still a net cost to the city (of$21,866). However, the total cost to the city is roughly one-half 
of the original average subsidy. That is, rehabilitation provides benefits to the city equal to about 
one-half of the original subsidy level ($42,000). Demolition, on the other hand, costs the city an 
average of just over $9,000. Although subsidy appears to be a much more costly alternative up-
front (a $40,000 subsidy compared to no subsidy for demolition), after a systematic review of 
costs and benefits, the difference between the two strategies is closer to $12,000. City officials 
must decide whether the non-fiscal and non-quantifiable benefits of rehabilitation are worth a 
$12,000 expenditure. 
* * * 
Vacant houses in economically and socially troubled neighborhoods are obvious signs of 
distress and deceptively easy targets for efforts at intervention. Vacancy indicates both a decline 
in the attractiveness of a neighborhood for housing choice and a lack of private market demand 
for investment. Continuing cycles of decline are self-reinforcing in several ways. Housing which 
is allowed to deteriorate in a core neighborhood may reach a point where it is not economically 
feasible to save even if the neighborhood becomes more attractive for other reasons, such as 
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proximity to urban amenities. Deteriorating housing conditions also depress property values in 
neighborhoods which are often home to low-income residents. This negates any equity they 
might have hoped to capture in their homes. Homeowners wishing to move then find they cannot 
get enough by selling their home to repay the mortgage due, which might encourage further 
abandonment. 
The impacts of the deteriorated housing and falling values are especially cruel in low-
income neighborhoods, because those residents are least able to afford taking a loss on their prime 
investment~ yet they are also least likely to be able to afford necessary repairs to keep up their 
homes or have options of finding housing in other areas. Falling property values also discourage 
existing homeowners from investing in maintaining or improving their properties, leading to 
further deterioration. 
Public intervention is necessary to halt, or at a minimum, slow this cycle of decline. The 
housing stock of a city is as important an aspect of its infrastructure as its streets or sewers. The 
condition of a city's housing determines its value and the city's ability to generate property tax 
revenue. It also impacts the demand for infrastructure outlays by influencing where people live 
and where they spent their workday and their paycheck. The condition of the city's housing stock 
also influences how attractive a city is to businesses and visitors. 
Because of the spillover effects of other properties .and overall neighborhood conditions, 
property owners often are unable to capture private investments made in maintaining and 
improving their properties. Private investment in rehabilitation may also be deterred by a lack of 
available credit in core neighborhoods because of past investment experience or discriminatory 
practices. 
Given the economic risks present in encouraging low income people to become 
homeowners, some might argue that public sector efforts might better be focused on providing 
better options for rental housing in the city. However, St Paul has a history of strong 
neighborhoods and has chosen to focus on continuing that strength through homeownership. It is 
thought that homeowners are more likely to invest in their neighborhoods because of their 
financial interest and longer tenure. It is also thought that homeowners are to be valued for 
directly contributing to the health of the city through residential property taxes and less use of 
police services. 
Intervention by the public sector in maintaining and improving housing conditions may 
also act to make core neighborhoods more attractive to more moderate income property owners. 
The neighborhoods are often well-positioned within the city, close to the downtown and 
accessible to public transportation. They also offer homes with some of the features characteristic 
of old houses, such as oak woodwork, hardwood floors and leaded glass, at an affordable price. 
By providing opportunities for integration of moderate income property owners, capacity within 
the neighborhood is increased to generate tax revenue, maintain properties and provide social role 
models. It also serves to deconcentrate poverty in the neighborhoods and thereby might decrease 
its effects by reducing crime and need for social spending. (This scenario also points to the 
necessity to provide opportunities for affordable housing in moderate- and higher-income areas to 
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allow for their economic integration and avoid the crowding out associated with gentrification.) 
This study shows that in addition to these benefits, there are ample public sector fiscal 
benefits associated with a policy of rehabilitation of vacant houses. One important factor for local 
policy makers is the extent to which the fiscal benefits are captured by levels of government other 
than the municipality. This could be used as a justification for greater state and county level 
participation in housing rehabilitation programs. These non-municipal levels of government also 
share disproportionately in the costs of demolition or reoccupation. Finally, though the policy 
debate in St. Paul at this moment focuses on the size of the subsidy provided by the city through 
Houses to Homes, one cannot assume that reducing the average subsidy from $40,000 to $20,000 
will simply produce one-half the benefits described in the report. Our findings are based on actual 
program experience. The spillover investment (that accounts for the bulk of the benefits 
associated with rehabilitation) we found resulted from Houses to Homes projects that averaged a 
$40,000 subsidy. It may well be the case that the amount of rehabilitation bought by a $20,000 
subsidy is insufficient to generate any market response. We have no data on this question, nor is 
there a way to estimate an answer. 
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